NIS 2 Directive, Preamble 31-40.
(31) Entities belonging to the digital infrastructure sector are in essence based on network and information systems and therefore the obligations imposed on those entities pursuant to this Directive should address in a comprehensive manner the physical security of such systems as part of their cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations. Since those matters are covered by this Directive, the obligations laid down in Chapters III, IV and VI of Directive (EU) 2022/2557 do not apply to such entities.
(32) Upholding and preserving a reliable, resilient and secure domain name system (DNS) are key factors in maintaining the integrity of the internet and are essential for its continuous and stable operation, on which the digital economy and society depend. Therefore, this Directive should apply to top-level-domain (TLD) name registries, and DNS service providers that are to be understood as entities providing publicly available recursive domain name resolution services for internet end-users or authoritative domain name resolution services for third-party usage. This Directive should not apply to root name servers.
(33) Cloud computing services should cover digital services that enable on-demand administration and broad remote access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable computing resources, including where such resources are distributed across several locations. Computing resources include resources such as networks, servers or other infrastructure, operating systems, software, storage, applications and services. The service models of cloud computing include, inter alia, Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS) and Network as a Service (NaaS).
The deployment models of cloud computing should include private, community, public and hybrid cloud. The cloud computing service and deployment models have the same meaning as the terms of service and deployment models defined under ISO/IEC 17788:2014 standard. The capability of the cloud computing user to unilaterally self-provision computing capabilities, such as server time or network storage, without any human interaction by the cloud computing service provider could be described as on-demand administration.
The term ‘broad remote access’ is used to describe that the cloud capabilities are provided over the network and accessed through mechanisms promoting use of heterogeneous thin or thick client platforms, including mobile phones, tablets, laptops and workstations. The term ‘scalable’ refers to computing resources that are flexibly allocated by the cloud service provider, irrespective of the geographical location of the resources, in order to handle fluctuations in demand.
The term ‘elastic pool’ is used to describe computing resources that are provided and released according to demand in order to rapidly increase and decrease resources available depending on workload. The term ‘shareable’ is used to describe computing resources that are provided to multiple users who share a common access to the service, but where the processing is carried out separately for each user, although the service is provided from the same electronic equipment. The term ‘distributed’ is used to describe computing resources that are located on different networked computers or devices and which communicate and coordinate among themselves by message passing.
(34) Given the emergence of innovative technologies and new business models, new cloud computing service and deployment models are expected to appear in the internal market in response to evolving customer needs. In that context, cloud computing services may be delivered in a highly distributed form, even closer to where data are being generated or collected, thus moving from the traditional model to a highly distributed one (edge computing).
(35) Services offered by data centre service providers may not always be provided in the form of a cloud computing service. Accordingly, data centres may not always constitute a part of cloud computing infrastructure. In order to manage all the risks posed to the security of network and information systems, this Directive should therefore cover providers of data centre services that are not cloud computing services.
For the purposes of this Directive, the term ‘data centre service’ should cover provision of a service that encompasses structures, or groups of structures, dedicated to the centralised accommodation, interconnection and operation of information technology (IT) and network equipment providing data storage, processing and transport services together with all the facilities and infrastructures for power distribution and environmental control. The term ‘data centre service’ should not apply to in-house corporate data centres owned and operated by the entity concerned, for its own purposes.
(36) Research activities play a key role in the development of new products and processes. Many of those activities are carried out by entities that share, disseminate or exploit the results of their research for commercial purposes. Those entities can therefore be important players in value chains, which makes the security of their network and information systems an integral part of the overall cybersecurity of the internal market.
Research organisations should be understood to include entities which focus the essential part of their activities on the conduct of applied research or experimental development, within the meaning of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Frascati Manual 2015: Guidelines for Collecting and Reporting Data on Research and Experimental Development, with a view to exploiting their results for commercial purposes, such as the manufacturing or development of a product or process, the provision of a service, or the marketing thereof.
(37) The growing interdependencies are the result of an increasingly cross-border and interdependent network of service provision using key infrastructures across the Union in sectors such as energy, transport, digital infrastructure, drinking water and waste water, health, certain aspects of public administration, as well as space in so far as the provision of certain services depending on ground-based infrastructures that are owned, managed and operated either by Member States or by private parties is concerned, therefore not covering infrastructures owned, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Union as part of its space programme.
Those interdependencies mean that any disruption, even one initially confined to one entity or one sector, can have cascading effects more broadly, potentially resulting in far-reaching and long-lasting negative impacts in the delivery of services across the internal market. The intensified cyberattacks during the COVID-19 pandemic have shown the vulnerability of increasingly interdependent societies in the face of low-probability risks.
(38) In view of the differences in national governance structures and in order to safeguard already existing sectoral arrangements or Union supervisory and regulatory bodies, Member States should be able to designate or establish one or more competent authorities responsible for cybersecurity and for the supervisory tasks under this Directive.
(39) In order to facilitate cross-border cooperation and communication among authorities and to enable this Directive to be implemented effectively, it is necessary for each Member State to designate a single point of contact responsible for coordinating issues related to the security of network and information systems and cross-border cooperation at Union level.
(40) The single points of contact should ensure effective cross-border cooperation with relevant authorities of other Member States and, where appropriate, with the Commission and ENISA. The single points of contact should therefore be tasked with forwarding notifications of significant incidents with cross-border impact to the single points of contact of other affected Member States upon the request of the CSIRT or the competent authority. At national level, the single points of contact should enable smooth cross-sectoral cooperation with other competent authorities. The single points of contact could also be the addressees of relevant information about incidents concerning financial entities from the competent authorities under Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 which they should be able to forward, as appropriate, to the CSIRTs or the competent authorities under this Directive.
Note: This is the final text of the NIS 2 Directive. The full name is "Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)".
Articles, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS 2 Directive):
https://www.nis-2-directive.com/NIS_2_Directive_Articles.html