NIS 2 Directive, Preamble 121-130.
(121) The processing of personal data, to the extent necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ensuring security of network and information systems by essential and important entities, could be considered to be lawful on the basis that such processing complies with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject, in accordance with the requirements of Article 6(1), point (c), and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679.
Processing of personal data could also be necessary for legitimate interests pursued by essential and important entities, as well as providers of security technologies and services acting on behalf of those entities, pursuant to Article 6(1), point (f), of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, including where such processing is necessary for cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements or the voluntary notification of relevant information in accordance with this Directive.
Measures related to the prevention, detection, identification, containment, analysis and response to incidents, measures to raise awareness in relation to specific cyber threats, exchange of information in the context of vulnerability remediation and coordinated vulnerability disclosure, the voluntary exchange of information about those incidents, and cyber threats and vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, tactics, techniques and procedures, cybersecurity alerts and configuration tools could require the processing of certain categories of personal data, such as IP addresses, uniform resources locators (URLs), domain names, email addresses and, where they reveal personal data, time stamps.
Processing of personal data by the competent authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, could constitute a legal obligation or be considered to be necessary for carrying out a task in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller pursuant to Article 6(1), point (c) or (e), and Article 6(3) of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, or for pursuing a legitimate interest of the essential and important entities, as referred to in Article 6(1), point (f), of that Regulation.
Furthermore, national law could lay down rules allowing the competent authorities, the single points of contact and the CSIRTs, to the extent that is necessary and proportionate for the purpose of ensuring the security of network and information systems of essential and important entities, to process special categories of personal data in accordance with Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, in particular by providing for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of natural persons, including technical limitations on the re-use of such data and the use of state-of-the-art security and privacy-preserving measures, such as pseudonymisation, or encryption where anonymisation may significantly affect the purpose pursued.
(122) In order to strengthen the supervisory powers and measures that help ensure effective compliance, this Directive should provide for a minimum list of supervisory measures and means through which the competent authorities can supervise essential and important entities. In addition, this Directive should establish a differentiation of supervisory regime between essential and important entities with a view to ensuring a fair balance of obligations on those entities and on the competent authorities.
Therefore, essential entities should be subject to a comprehensive ex ante and ex post supervisory regime, while important entities should be subject to a light, ex post only, supervisory regime. Important entities should therefore not be required to systematically document compliance with cybersecurity risk-management measures, while the competent authorities should implement a reactive ex post approach to supervision and, hence, not have a general obligation to supervise those entities.
The ex post supervision of important entities may be triggered by evidence, indication or information brought to the attention of the competent authorities considered by those authorities to suggest potential infringements of this Directive. For example, such evidence, indication or information could be of the type provided to the competent authorities by other authorities, entities, citizens, media or other sources or publicly available information, or could emerge from other activities conducted by the competent authorities in the fulfilment of their tasks.
(123) The execution of supervisory tasks by the competent authorities should not unnecessarily hamper the business activities of the entity concerned. Where the competent authorities execute their supervisory tasks in relation to essential entities, including the conduct of on-site inspections and off-site supervision, the investigation of infringements of this Directive and the conduct of security audits or security scans, they should minimise the impact on the business activities of the entity concerned.
(124) In the exercise of ex ante supervision, the competent authorities should be able to decide on the prioritisation of the use of supervisory measures and means at their disposal in a proportionate manner. This entails that the competent authorities can decide on such prioritisation based on supervisory methodologies which should follow a risk-based approach.
More specifically, such methodologies could include criteria or benchmarks for the classification of essential entities into risk categories and corresponding supervisory measures and means recommended per risk category, such as the use, frequency or types of on-site inspections, targeted security audits or security scans, the type of information to be requested and the level of detail of that information. Such supervisory methodologies could also be accompanied by work programmes and be assessed and reviewed on a regular basis, including on aspects such as resource allocation and needs. In relation to public administration entities, the supervisory powers should be exercised in line with the national legislative and institutional frameworks.
(125) The competent authorities should ensure that their supervisory tasks in relation to essential and important entities are carried out by trained professionals, who should have the necessary skills to carry out those tasks, in particular with regard to conducting on-site inspections and off-site supervision, including the identification of weaknesses in databases, hardware, firewalls, encryption and networks. Those inspections and that supervision should be conducted in an objective manner.
(126) In duly substantiated cases where it is aware of a significant cyber threat or an imminent risk, the competent authority should be able to take immediate enforcement decisions with the aim of preventing or responding to an incident.
(127) In order to make enforcement effective, a minimum list of enforcement powers that can be exercised for breach of the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations provided for in this Directive should be laid down, setting up a clear and consistent framework for such enforcement across the Union. Due regard should be given to the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement of this Directive, the material or non-material damage caused, whether the infringement was intentional or negligent, actions taken to prevent or mitigate the material or non-material damage, the degree of responsibility or any relevant previous infringements, the degree of cooperation with the competent authority and any other aggravating or mitigating factor.
The enforcement measures, including administrative fines, should be proportionate and their imposition should be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general principles of Union law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’), including the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the rights of the defence.
(128) This Directive does not require Member States to provide for criminal or civil liability with regard to natural persons with responsibility for ensuring that an entity complies with this Directive for damage suffered by third parties as a result of an infringement of this Directive.
(129) In order to ensure effective enforcement of the obligations laid down in this Directive, each competent authority should have the power to impose or request the imposition of administrative fines.
(130) Where an administrative fine is imposed on an essential or important entity that is an undertaking, an undertaking should be understood to be an undertaking in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU for those purposes. Where an administrative fine is imposed on a person that is not an undertaking, the competent authority should take account of the general level of income in the Member State as well as the economic situation of the person when considering the appropriate amount of the fine. It should be for the Member States to determine whether and to what extent public authorities should be subject to administrative fines. Imposing an administrative fine does not affect the application of other powers of the competent authorities or of other penalties laid down in the national rules transposing this Directive.
Note: This is the final text of the NIS 2 Directive. The full name is "Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)".
Articles, Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS 2 Directive):